Mollen do in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries increasingly participated actively in the political and social life, resulting in various conflicts with the elites. As the national revolution under Nicolás de Piérola in 1894/1895 did not lead to the desired improvements, urban subalterns and their middle-class brokers asserted their own claim for participation. With the assistance of their followers from the ranks of the workers, artisans, and employees, the political movement of the Liberal-Independientes successfully participated in local and national elections despite the fierce resistance of the Arequipeñan establishment. Well interconnected with Arequipa's subaltern social organizations the Liberal-Independientes not only served political representation, but adopting socialist ideology also provided ideas how participation actually could be implemented. One of the most appropriate means was the numerous strikes subalterns went on in order to enforce their claims for higher wages or the reducing of working hours, to name the most popular.
In the historiography of Peru, the years of the so-called "Aristocratic Republic", 1895 to 1919, are generally characterized as a relatively stable period due to the absence of greater economic crises and national revolutions. 1 Indeed, a combination of economic growth, infrastructural development -in many studies coined "modernization" -, and broad (though not complete) political agreement between the dominant political forces of the Civilistas and the Demócratas resulted in a societal stability unprecedented in modern Peruvian history. Nevertheless, several local and regional con-flicts arose across the country, which were rightly labeled as "Emergence of the Social Question" by Peter Klarén. 2 In reference to this, a research gap exists for the southern department of Arequipa and its homonymic capital. Guided by the question of how subalterns struggled for and finally won political participation and social achievements, I will show in this article that political and social conflicts emerged notwithstanding the relatively positive parameters, and that the quiet years of the "Aristocratic Republic" in Arequipa -as elsewhere -were not that quiet at all. Subalterns expanded their reach of action, entered the political and social arena, and quite often forced the elites consisting of employers and the local administration to respond to their demands. Invigorated with a political and social self-consciousness they had gained in the course and after the revolution of 1894/95, urban subalterns in Arequipa and Mollendo in the early decades of the twentieth century made use of various means of political resistance, most importantly by supporting the political movement of the Liberal-Independientes and organizing labor strikes to enforce their interests.
Fernando Ponce, an Arequipeño himself, described Arequipa as "an emotionally charged concept in Peru". 3 Nevertheless, the study of subaltern aspiration for political and social participation in Arequipa supplies us with insights transferable to the rest of the country and even the rest of the continent. Despite regional specificities, many Latin American societies experienced similar processes.
Arequipa is located approximately 750 kilometers south of Lima and at a 90 kilometer distance from the coast, 2.350 meters above sea level. At the turn of the century, the city had a population of about 35.000 inhabitants. Because of its infrastructural connection to the harbor town of Mollendo (with a population of approximately 5.000) via the Southern Peruvian railroad, Arequipa constituted -and still constitutes -the region's link between the coast and the Andean sierra. Sparsely industrialized in the period under investigation, Arequipa owed its economic importance to the wholesalers (casas mayoristas) that bought up wool -the region's most important export staple -produced by hacendados (large landowners) and campesinos (peasants) in the highland, and exported it via Mollendo to Europe, mainly England.
4 Given Arequipa's economic importance, it is quite astonishing that studies on Peru's second city and regional metropolis of the South are scarce in absolute numbers as well as compared to much smaller Cuzco (which, of course, being the hub of indigenismo fascinates historians and cultural scientists alike). A valuable exception, of course, is Sarah Chambers's terrific study From Subjects to Citizens. 5 Chambers ascertained that major parts of Arequipa's population won esteem by adapting elitist habitus but without gaining concrete political and social participation in the first half of the nineteenth century. My article ties in with Chambers's work by showing how subalterns tried to remedy this absence of political power at the beginning of the twentieth century. Obviously, my research hereon is informed by postcolonial and subaltern studies which, despite justified criticism, still promise to open up new perspectives on the history of Peru and Latin America in general. Combined with Hobsbawmian and Thompsonian approaches of labor history and studies on political culture, social movements, and conflicts I intend to write a social history from below of the formation of Arequipa's working class.
the Revolution of 1894/95 in Arequipa
In the nineteenth century, various rebellions and revolutions originated in Arequipa; the nickname of Leon del Sur and pueblo caudillo derives from this. Even today, every Arequipeño aware of his tradition would tell the anecdote of the artisan or chacarero (small farmer) hearing the cathedral's bells ring, grabbing his rifle from the wall, running to the street and asking his neighbor: "¿Y ahora, por quién peleamos?" As Chambers's study has shown, the civic consciousness-adapted in Arequipa by non-elitist groups such as artisans in the decades following the country's independenceresulted in the male citizens' aspiration to participate in the city's politics without challenging the elite's hegemony openly.
Based on ideas of regionalism and/or Catholicism, earlier revolutions in Arequipa were traditionally headed by local elites and/or military officers. And while the national revolution of 1894/95 was led by former president Nicolás de Piérola (1839-1913), it was fought and won by subalterns in the streets of Arequipa. The conduct of Arequipeñan elites is described by Arequipeño Víctor Andrés Belaúnde (1883-1966) in his memoirs: "Cerramos a piedra y lodo las puertas y ventanas de la casa y del almacén, siempre expuestos a la violencia en tiempos de desorden." 6 When in 1894 the democratic caudillo and Arequipeño Piérola took charge of the revolution against the government of Andrés Avelino Cáceres (1833/36-1923), he was supported by the majority of the population of his native town. According to scholarly literature, the revolutionary coalition of former opponents -Civilistas and Demócratas -pursued legalistic objectives, namely to save the republic against a coup d'état of Cáceres and his constitutionalist party. 7 To save Peru from falling into the hands of a tyrant and to put an end to dictatorship, Piérola allegedly was able to count on the republican creed of most citizens. Indeed, a mass movement evolved and defeated the governmental forces in a most bloody national upheaval. But at least in Arequipa, apart from the civic consciousness that made Arequipeños to defend "the just cause", above all the people were inspired by the vague hope for broader participation they expected from Piérola's promise of political change.
As early as in April 1894, elections caused unrest in Arequipa. 8 While montoneras (irregular troops) operated in various parts of the country, over the course of the year revolutionary agitation spread in Arequipa. Various organizations clandestinely politicized and mobilized students and artisans, as well as railroad and factory workers. 9 Most prominent mobilization and 6 Víctor Andrés Belaúnde, Trayectoria y destino. Memorias, César Pacheco Vélez (ed.), vol. 1 (Lima 1967), p. 85. 7 This interpretation of the events goes back to Jorge Basadre, Historia de la República del Perú, vol. 6 (Lima 5 1964), especially: p. 3019-3023, and since then was repeated by numerous historians. As the civil war/revolution of 1894/95 marks a major caesura in Peru's history -the end of a chaotic period of economic downturn, national bankruptcy, Chilean occupation, territorial loss, and the beginning of rather stable times -it would deserve a detailed study that lacks to this day. Nils Jacobsen started a project on this topic that will hopefully be finished in a not too distant future. 8 Cf. La Bolsa, February 4, 1894, p. 2; and El Deber, February 4, 1894, p. 1. 9 Cf. for the mobilization in Arequipa the promising draft of a chapter of Jacobsen's already mentioned work on the revolution: Nils Jacobsen, "Bridging the Local and the National: Political Mobilization During Peru's Revolution of 1894-95", undated manuscript, http://www.drclas.harvard.edu/uploads/images/1186/Jacobsen.Peru.1894-95.pdf [2012-08-20] . For a comparison with rural sites in the North, cf. Nils Jacobsen/Alejandro Díez Hurtado, "Montoneras, la comuna de Chalaco y la revolución de Piérola. La sierra piurana entre el clientelismo y la sociedad civil, 1868- 10 Both being members of established local families, the two men were nevertheless progressively minded, with Gómez de la Torre even being an adherent of radical (and later anarchist) Manuel González Prada. Most members of the Asociación Patriótica were from the academic milieu of the middle and upper classes who, apart from patriotic and nationalist ideas, shared politically progressive ideas as well. As will be shown later, del Prado, Gómez de la Torre, and other members like Máximo Guinassi Morán (1871 Morán ( -1935 or José Segundo Osorio (1860-1948) kept being involved in politics advocating the cause of the subaltern.
In the morning of January 27, 1895, revolutionary troops of the South led by Colonel Eduardo Yessúp reached the city of Arequipa. 200 to 300 montoneros took the train from Vítor, some 30 kilometers from Arequipa, and got off at Tingo station in the outskirts of the city where the battle of Arequipa began at 7:45 am. Against the superiority of more than 400 government forces, the revolutionaries probably would have been without a chance had it not been for the pueblo arequipeño. Subalterns organized by Francisco Ramos Pacheco, an old friend of Piérola's, enthusiastically supported the revolution and together with the montonera won the garrisons, the prison, and the Cathedral's towers which were of strategic importance for the control of the city's center. After nine and a half hours of fierce fighting during which several hundred combatants lost their lives, the coalition forces finally took the prefecture.
11 With almost absolute certainty there were no members of the elites involved in the revolution in Arequipa: They would have been mentioned in the newspapers that celebrated the revolution (but at the same time called for the reestablishment of law and order). Probably they acted the same way the Belaúndes did. 10 For the program of the organization cf. the statutes archived in the Biblioteca Nacional del Perú: "Estatutos de la 'Asociación Patriótica' de Arequipa" (Arequipa 1890). For the Liga Obrera, cf. Jacobsen, "Bridging the Local and the National" (note 9), p. 15. 11 Cf. El Deber, February 11, 1895; La Bolsa, February 11, 1895; and February 14, 1895; and Belaúnde, Trayectoria y destino (note 6), p. 87. Víctor Nazario Benavente Flores, Historia sintética de Arequipa (Arequipa 1940), p. 146, indicates the number of 400 dead. Nils Jacobsen estimates 260 dead, most of them on the part of the Arequipeñan supporters of the montoneros. Jacobsen, "Bridging the Local and the National" (note 9), p. 17. In total, the civil war cost the life of 5.000 to 10.000 Peruvians. In the battle for Lima alone 1.500 died or were injured. Cf. El Deber, March 22, 1895, p. 2.
The revolution brought about neither major political nor social change. In July 1895, Piérola won presidential elections and implemented various measures to modernize the country. But as Peter Klarén states, "[f] or the mass of population, however, Piérola apparently did very little. Indeed Peru's leading historian, Jorge Basadre, has suggested that Piérola lost an excellent, possibly the last, opportunity to integrate the popular classes into the framework of the nation's political process." 12 When Arequipeño Eduardo de Romaña in 1899 assumed presidency (and not the radical Guillermo Billinghurst), it became apparent that broader participation and inclusion of formerly excluded citizens were not to be expected. Of course, this had never been intended by Piérola. The charismatic caudillo had cleverly integrated Catholic-conservative, liberal, and even radical (that is, the most progressive, leftist) political forces without any concrete promises. Not long after the revolution, euphoria vanished, the coalition broke up, and the different political factions and fractions collided.
But regardless of the fact that political and social life after the revolution was much like it had been before, Arequipeñan events of January 27, 1895, had demonstrated at least one thing: Subalterns were not only subject-turned-citizen manpower to be manipulated and instrumentalized by the local elites, that mostly did not participate in the revolution. They could also act on account of their own, pursue their own interests -in this case a vague hope for change -and they were indeed willing to fight for their cause. And with the help and guidance from skilled politicians and academics, they could be victorious. Subaltern power manifested itself as soon as in March 1895, in a popular assembly on Arequipa's Plaza de Armas which the Asociación Patriótica and the local chapter of the Demócratas had called for. Amador del Solar, the first Vice-president's son and post-revolutionary regional civilist leader after the revolution had taken over control of the Arequipeñan administration. But the people assisting in the assembly chased him out of office, freed radical Demócrata Ramos Pacheco from prison, and proclaimed the popular hero of the revolution Yéssup as their new prefect. Frustrated with the absence of the change they had hoped for, the more radical part of the revolutionary coalition in Arequipa remained active after its break-up. The hub for exchanging political ideas was the Universidad Nacional de San Agustín (UNSA). In 1897, a clandestine male circle called Liga de Librepensadores was founded. Students and academics from the upper and middle classes read and discussed radical-liberal, progressive, and socialist works imported from Europe.
14 Among the members of this circle were the future leaders of the Liberal-Independientes, Mariano Lino Urquieta (1867-1920), a Moqueguaborn doctor who had studied in Lima (where he got in contact with Manuel González Prada) and in July 1895 had come to Arequipa, and Francisco Mostajo Miranda (1874-1953), the son of artisan-activist Santiago Mostajo y Quiroz (1845-1935), as well as Modesto Málaga, José Manuel Chávez Bedoya, Francisco Chuquihuanca Ayulo, and others who were to become prominent members of the party. The Librepensadores were in contact with the radical members of the Asociación Patriótica mentioned above. Urquie ta was a member as well. These men, who had all studied at UNSA, formed a social network based on admiration for González Prada and his radicalism, and newly acquired radical-liberal and socialist ideas. In 1900, frustration with the political situation on the one hand and political ideologization on the other had gained momentum large enough for the group to act. Shortly before the municipal elections were to be held in December, the Liga Municipal Independiente was founded. For the national election campaign in 1901 the name was changed into Partido Independiente, later Partido Liberal-Independiente (also written unhyphenated), and finally, in 1903, into Arequipeñan section of the national Partido Liberal led by Augusto Durand Maldonado.
In my investigation of the Liberal-Independientes, I will spare readers with the dissection of the political and literary oeuvre of their leaders. Instead, I will focus on the followers of the party. According to the party's first program, published in the local newspaper La Bolsa, members consisted of: "a) propietarios, b) abogados, médicos, ingenerios, boticarios, profesores i preceptores de instrucción, estudiantes i otros individuos de profesiones liberales, c) militares, d) agricultores i jornaleros, e) comerciantes, f) manufactureros, artesanos, mineros i demás industriales, g) obreros del Ferrocarril." 16 Especially the latter groups were of importance for the Liberal-Independientes as well as for the formation of the Arequipeñan working class. Since 1890, railroad workers had been organized in the Sociedad Fraternal de Empleados y Obreros del Ferrocarril. Moreover -and not to be taken for granted -, they met the criteria for the right to vote (which since a reform by Piérola in 1896 was based on an alphabetical census) which they all exer- Just as the railroad was "the" symbol of progress and seen as indicator for the level of modernization, railroad workers were considered to be part of the liberal-independent political and social avant-garde. As will be shown later, they were indeed the nucleus of the Arequipeñan working class.
The most formative and numerous subaltern group in Arequipa consisted of the artisans who were producing their goods in workshops often integrated into the home, with their own means of production and with only a few assistants and/or with the support of the family -and thus are not to be counted as typical workers in the sense of Marx. But as "[t]hriving economic centers, where processes of class formation would have pleased social historians, were not exactly numerous in Latin America before 1930", 18 Latin American labor history tends to include artisans. And tying in with Edward Palmer Thompson's conception of class, I will show in the following that artisans indeed -at least at times -turned into workers.
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The importance of this special social group can be explained by its high level of organization. Since the first half of the nineteenth century, the different crafts were organized in gremios (guilds), 20 and in 1866 the comprehensive Sociedad de Artesanos was founded, followed by various similar institutions. In the November of 1900, at the time when the LiberalIndependientes emerged, the already mentioned Santiago Mostajo, Francisco's father, founded the Sociedad Patriótica de Artesanos. The artisans' organization elected the wholesaler Jorge Stafford to be its traditional patron and appointed Urquieta and Jorge Polar, reformist rector of the UNSA, honorary presidents. 21 Comprehensive artisan organization finally reached its peak with the establishment of the Centro Social Obrero on July 22, 1905, which was presided again by Mostajo. Exceeding simple mutualism, its aim was to improve workers' social situation by officially representing their cause and by offering them educational and recreational facilities. 22 Thus the Centro can be seen as predecessor of the unions and historical link to the traditional fraternal associations. In terms of political ideology as well as personnel, the Centro was linked to the LiberalIndependientes: On the one hand, the Centro's members, for the most part, were staunch supporters of the party and engaged in electoral rallies, campaigns, and violent clashes with its enemies, and in 1909 Santiago Mostajo ran for the post of diputado suplente for the liberal-independent list. 23 On the other hand, prominent Liberal-Independientes assisted in the Centro's events and assumed some of its posts. The relation is most obvious, of course, in the case of father and son Mostajo. Increasing artisan organization had various effects: It facilitated mobilization, pro- vided them with pride and a distinct collective identity, and enabled the formation of proper political ideas independent from elitist and clerical dictation. 24 Remarkably, despite being mentioned in the party's program cited above, rural subalterns and members of the lowest social segment -servants, parlormaids and dishwashers, today's informales like hawkers, shoe blackers, tinkers, water carriers, ice-sellers, porters, laundrywomen, mule skinners, musicians, run-down artisans, and surely at least part of the employees in the wholesalers' wool washing facilities at the banks of river Chili -are not to be made out as liberal-independent clientele in the sources. Neither are peasants. This does not necessarily mean that they were not involved. But some of these persons, due to clientelist structures, may have supported the conservative enemies of the Liberal-Independientes. The influence, power, and wealth of the Catholic Church as well as of many old Arequipeñan families were grounded in land ownership. Small peasant farmers, thus, were dependent from those patrons they were leasing from. The same might go for some -but clearly not for allemployees at the homes, shops, and companies of conservative Arequipeños.
The support of railroad workers and artisans ensured some remarkable electoral successes for the Liberal-Independientes. Subalterns accepted the Liberal-Independentes as brokers and agreed to their offer of political representation. Liberal-independent leaders from the middle and upper classes supported González Prada's aspiration: "[L]a unión o alianza de la inteligencia con el trabajo" without the intellectual being the "tutor o lazarillo del obrero". 25 Despite fraud, manipulation, annulations, and violent oppression, liberal-independent candidates in the first decades of the twentieth century were elected to Congress and Senate (Lino Urquieta from 1909 to 1915 was member of congress and from 1915 to 1919 senator for Arequi pa). As the results in Arequipa's newspapers reveal, the Liberal-Independien- 24 1.-Los que constituían el jurado electoral eran elegidos entre los grupos profesionales de la ciudad, donde habían mayor número de conservadores, 2.-Los que integraban las mesas receptoras de sufragios se escogía entre los 'mayores propietarios' de la ciudad, casi siempre conservadores y, 3.-Los que debían 'calificar' la elección y, por tanto, declarar ganadores, eran los munícipes que continuaban en sus cargos y, entre ellos, obviamente los conservadores tenían amplia mayoría, pues la Municipalidad 'les pertenecía' desde tiempo inmemoral."
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Manipulating elections before these were actually effected -quite common in Arequipa for instance by way of "losing" registries or preventing the inscription of liberal-independent voters -was less risky because the democratic act itself was left untouched and did not run the risk of being annulled. Nevertheless, electoral rallies and elections often enough resulted in bloody fights between the political opponents. Fair and peaceful elections were such an exception in early twentieth century Arequipa that Francisco Mostajo's El Volcán even titled "Mejor que en Suiza" when in 1911 elections for Congress were effected regularly, despite (or because of) tensions within the Civilist Party. 27 The role of subalterns in society and liberal-independent confidence in official institutions and political processes thus was not strengthened. But confidence is required to avoid violence. 28 The recourse to violence as a passed-on and seemingly legitimate part of the set of forms of action of political culture was suggestive -all the more because liberal-independent leaders did not principally condemn violence (although they did not call for it).
29 Admittedly, the political opponents and their followers drew on violence, too.
Arequipa's subalterns made use of nearly every means in the realm of political culture to enforce the claim for participation and resist the quasi absolute dominance and control exercised by conservative elites. 30 The Liberal-Independientes propagated their claim in public speeches at meetings and manifestations as well as in their own newspapers which had telling titles like El Ariete, La Bandera Roja, La Defensa Obrera, or El Sufragio Libre, to name a few. 31 These papers were read out publicly in taverns, in the streets, or at workplaces and thus also reached illiterate subalterns. 32 A broad range of possible followers and voters were thus informed about the goals of liberal-independent politics, including the already mentioned claims for broader political participation and social rights for subalterns. Moreover, concepts for national integration, administrational reforms in a regionalist perspective, educational reforms, a proto-indigenist advocacy for the indigenous population, and anti-clerical secularization and laicism were liberal-independent concerns.
The latter of these caused -naturally -the bitter enmity of the Church. Catholicism was particularly strong in Arequipa and represented conservative values in line with existing political, social, and economic order and the efforts to preserve it. In Church-run schools, in Catholic associations . Their crucial point of social movements being "sustained campaigns of claim making" (p. 111) has to be connected with the concept of political culture which "sees politics as about making claims; as the activity through which individuals and groups in any society articulate, negotiate, implement, and enforce the competing claims they make upon one another, and upon the whole. Political culture is, in this sense, the set of discourses or symbolic practices by which these claims are made. (including, for instance, the Unión Católica -one for men and one for women -for members of the elites, the Círculo de Obreros Católicos for subalterns, or the student Juventud Católica), and from the pulpit, priests, nuns, monks, and lay people preached temperance and respect for the family as well as the secular and, of course, the Catholic authorities. Thus the Catholic Church, local and regional official authorities, and (part of) the old Arequipeñan families and wholesalers formed a powerful coalition. As some Arequipeños were dependent on Catholic and elite patrons, had been educated in Catholic schools and/or attended the mass, 33 the conservative elites could count on popular support as well as on the loyalty of police, guards, and military -which often resulted in the aforementioned bloody fights in the streets during election days, manifestations, and political meetings.
Repression by political enemies and officials was powerful in Are quipa, despite a minimum of control exercised by civil society institutions like the Centro Social Obrero and the liberal press. 34 Due to the total lack of rule of law and nearly unlimited power and despotism of local gamonales ("exploitative rural boss[es] of the Peruvian Andes"), 35 liberal-independent ideas only were brought to the rural provinces by persons that, in one way or another, were involved in the Arequipeñan group. 36 Thus, the liberalindependent movement was primarily an urban issue. Official repression, still intensified during Leguía's oncenio (dictatorship from 1919 to 1930), was a major factor for the vanishing of the Liberal-Independientes. But also the party's caudillo-centered structure was outdated, and when Urquieta died in 1920, there was no other leader able to replace him. Mostajo, for example, together with Málaga had quit the party in 1911 already, annoyed by the party's tactics and political compromises. Indeed, negotiation contributed to the Liberal-Independientes' decay as they first lost credibility and finally their identity. But drawing on the experiences of traditional institutions like the mutual societies and the ideas of González Prada and "classical" liberalism on the one hand, while on the other hand adapting 33 Some Arequipeños surely really feared for their salvation because of the blasphemies of the "enemigos de Dios", a fact that in our modern secularized academic environment easily might be neglected. new socialist ideas, the Liberal-Independientes in Arequipa had laid the ground for the future political left: Anarchists, the APRA, and the Communist Party. Leaving aside the mandates, the Liberal-Independientes' main achievement was to provide the ideas for the formation of the Arequipeñan working class.
the Formation of the Arequipeñan Working Class
When the Centro Social Obrero, in cooperation with the Sociedad Fraternal de Empleados y Obreros del Ferrocarril and the employees of the manufactories El Aguila and Fábrica de Elaborar Madera for the first time called for the celebration of an Arequipeñan May Day in 1906, this was clearly owed to the influence of liberal-independent political agitation. 37 As May 1 was a working day, the workers' and artisans' manifestation started at 6 pm on the premises of the Centro Social Obrero in Calle La Merced.
"Dos carros adornados con los símbolos del trabajo -una factoría en el primero y una prensa de imprimir en el segundo -adornados con banderas rojas eran conducidos por el gran grupo de artesanos, al cual seguían muchas personas." 38 Speeches were given, among others, by Santiago Mostajo and his son Francisco, who at that time was the head of the Liberal-Independientes. Young Mostajo reminded the participants of the 1886 events at Chicago's Haymarket and called for subversion of the existing order. 39 The workers' holiday was brought off with a speech "Algo sobre socialismo" given by Francisco Gómez de la Torre. By obviously referring to the Communist Manifesto, he explained the socialist ideals: aún pueden sintetizarse en uno: desaparición de las desigualdades sociales engendradas por la injusticia. [...] En otros términos: quiere el socialismo que así como nadie puede hacerse dueño de la luz ni del aire, nadie se llame dueño exclusivo de la tierra ni de las fuentes de producción: que éstas pertenezcan por igual a todos; que todos trabajen igualmente." 40 The speeches held at May Day demonstrate very clearly the transnational flow of socialist ideas. Speeches were an integral component not only of May Day and other manifestations, but also of the public spread of socialist ideas. On the occasion of May Day 1908, liberal-independent jurist Máximo Guinassi Morán gave a lecture on the works not only of Marx and Engels, but also of the French anarchist Sébastien Faure (1858-1942) in the Centro Social Obrero. Based on Marx's historical materialism and his dictum that history was nothing else but the history of class war, Guinassi Morán accused the Peruvian state of making use of repressive means in order to maintain the "antagonismo en la producción" and the "distinción de clases". He pushed the Arequipeños to associate in gremios parciales and sindicatos generales in order to organize the public claim for their rights. Solidarity would be required not only to improve the situation at the work place, but also in elections. Touting for liberal-independent voters, Guinassi Morán called Arequipa's subalterns to participate in the election of senators and members of congress "que no sean representantes bancos".
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Apart from the mobilizing and politicizing effects, May Day and other manifestations were important parts of Arequipa's subalterns' public sphere. The Liberal-Independientes, together with the artisans' and workers' organizations, took to the streets in order to enforce the claim for subaltern participation. Moreover, the celebration of May Day was a manifestation of class consciousness. When, in 1907, the Arequipeñan prefect wanted to ban red flags in public, the organizers of May Day protested: "como la BAN-DERA ROJA es la libertad, impedir que ondee es la tiranía." 42 This indicates that subaltern Arequipeños and their leaders had adopted socialist symbolism and how important they deemed it to be. Concrete claims, as for example the eighthour working day that workers were fighting for in other parts of the globe, did 40 not come to the fore on May Day in Arequipa -these claims were enforced in other ways, as will be shown later. Instead, May Day celebration aimed at the selfassurance and the public image of the participants as members of the working class.
Despite the constantly recurring self-designation as obreros (workers) surely not being a correct socio-economic categorization according to Marx, it expressed a proletarian self-conception and perpetually produced and reconstructed the collective identity of Arequipa's working class. Its formation primarily did not occur as part of industrialization, but on a level of discourse: by the denomination as workers, the rhetoric of class struggle, and the adaption of socialist texts, concepts, and symbolism. Artisans and employees in manufactories, in cooperation with railroad workers, became one group that increasingly acted in solidarity. Thus, the initial politicalideological process of subaltern class formation soon resulted in political, social, and economic achievements as shared class consciousness facilitated subaltern organization and successful labor struggle. 43 While in other regions of South America subaltern groups employed strikes already in the 1880s and 1890s in order to enforce their claims, in Arequipa labor struggles were only small-scaled, partial, spontaneous, uncoordinated, and as a result inefficient. 44 Although James Scott has shown that strikes can be successful without workers' organization, 45 in Arequipa it was up to the proletarian avant-garde of the well-organized railroad workers to accomplish the first effective strike. 46 Moreover, the harbor workers of Mollendo, another important group of workers in the transport sector, were involved in the strike. Of course, because of the strike of the railroaders, the latter had no work to do anyway. But instead of being annoyed with the strike and the resulting lack of income, they supported the strike -which can be interpreted as a sign of working-class solidarity. Strikes in the transport sector, in any case, were most effective as the region's economic spine, the export of wool, was affected. On the other hand, the Arequipeñan wholesalers and the Peruvian Corporation which maintained the railroad were two powerful interest groups. They arranged strict repression in the form of police, guards, and even army operations.
In June and July 1902, a dispute between the Peruvian Corporation and the railroaders led to a short strike in Arequipa. The workers, enflamed by a passionate speech of Urquieta, successfully fought for an increase in working hours (!) and thus a higher income. 47 But the Corporation's superintendent failed to implement this solution in Mollendo, so the railroaders there, supported by the harbor workers, went on strike, too. On July 15, about 500 protesters gathered on Mollendo's Plaza Grau where things escalated when the subprefect produced his revolver. One of the soldiers accompanying him was shot dead by the protesters that in the turmoil had disarmed various soldiers. When several hundred Mollendinos again gathered at the station near the beach in the next morning, they were encircled by guards, policemen, and a battalion of soldiers who inessentially fired into the crowd. Three protesters, among them one woman, were shot to death, and an unknown number of people was injured. After this horrific event, the pressure to achieve agreement was enormous for both sides, and the Arequipeñan solution was implemented in Mollendo the day after; the harbor 47 Cf. La Bolsa, July 1, 1902, p. 2; and for Urquieta's speech cf. El Ariete, June 30, 1902, p. 3. The grateful railway men later publicly thanked Urquieta and the "Liberal-Independientes" in a letter to El Ariete: "Porque finalmente, á ese Partido Liberal i á ese mismo 'Ariete' somos deudores del primer asomo de altivez popular, que en julio de 1902, dió por resultado el aumento de nuestros salarios i con él algún alivio á la miseria de nuestros pobres pero muy honrados hogares." El Ariete, March 14, 1903, p. 2.
workers received an increase of ten centavos per tonnage processed. 48 Despite having ended tragically, the strike of 1902 was a subaltern success. In the years that followed, railroad and harbor workers time and again made use of this means of the subaltern political culture to enforce their interests. The reasons to go on strike were ample: Although demands for higher wages were the main reason for most strikes, there were other aspects subalterns fought for: solidarity with colleagues or improvement of working conditions.
Strikes in March and November/December 1904 ended with successes for Mollendo's harbor workers and the employees of the Ferrocarril del Sur. 49 But repression as well as negotiation helped official authorities and elites to keep up business. In January 1905, the harbor workers again downed their work in solidarity with six colleagues that had been arrested accused of robbery, and to demand another rise in wages. But this time Mollendo's companies engaged strike breakers. As security forces were strong in Mollendo at that time, the workers were not able -as they had been on previous occasions -to bar the non-local workers from undermining their strike and went back to work. 50 A fourth strike that occurred in December 1905 was solved soon to the satisfaction of the harbor workers, who were granted special conditions for work at night and on Sundays and holidays. 51 The excessive use of strikes in 1904 and 1905 shows that solidary struggle had become a most effective means in the repertory of subaltern political culture in Arequipa. The railroad and harbor workers served as a role model for other subaltern groups, who adopted their fighting spirit as well. For instance, in December 1905, simultaneous to the strike of transport workers, the employees of the Arequipeñan tramway successfully struck for higher wages. 52 But apart from class-consciousness, other moti-vations are to be considered. A railroaders' strike meant that soon there was no work for the harbor workers to do (and vice versa), and as demands for higher wages were always popular, joining the strike was obvious and pragmatic. Nevertheless, the common action inspired and instructed by LiberalIndependientes' political agitation expressed a consciousness of subaltern ties, community, and solidarity.
53
To avoid irritation: Despite all achievements in labor conflicts, the living and working conditions of subalterns in Arequipa were poor. And in the second decade of the twentieth century, they got even worse in spite of increasing exports and best prices paid for wool on the world market. But the only profiteers of the boom were the wholesalers and big enterprises in the transport sector, like the Peruvian Corporation or Grace as well as largescale wool producing hacendados in the sierra. 54 Thus social tensions and inequalities aggravated.
Due to economic troubles in other sectors partly caused by World War I, rising prices and shortage plagued, above all, the subalterns. Food prices and rents rose to an extent hardly bearable for the poor. To cap it all, the government announced to raise taxes leading to broad protests in Arequipa in early 1915. On January 30, more than 7.000 protesters, about 20 percent of the city's overall population, gathered for a peaceful demonstration. In the end, they marched to the prefecture where the representative of governmental authorities, José M. Rodríguez de Riego, instructed them to end the manifestation. But the protesters wanted to return to the Plaza de Armas where demonstrations traditionally ended. When the peaceful atmosphere changed, Rodríguez del Riego called for his constables, and when some protesters picked up stones, one constable made use of his saber, which resulted in even more unrest. The prefect then ordered his men to fire into the crowd. Nine men were shot dead and at least twenty persons were In Mollendo, the harbor workers that were previously organized in different gremios founded the Unión Marítima in December 1917. About 450 Mollendinos, nearly 10 percent of the city's population, participated in the meeting. Because of worsening living conditions, they sent a memorial to the Cámara de Comercio de Mollendo demanding an increase in wages and the reduction of working hours. Even conservative El Deber was sympathetic to this. 59 As the employers did not respond to the petition, the harbor workers went on strike on March 16, 1918. Three days later, the railroad 55 workers from Mollendo to Cuzco joined the strike claiming wage increases. The hold-up was nearly complete, and the strike became a national concern as some feared for the trade with Bolivia which since the inauguration of the railway to La Paz in 1912 could be conducted via Arica, too. Lima's El Comercio took over nearly every article published in the local Mollendino newspapers as well as in Arequipa's El Deber and El Pueblo.
60
The strategy of employing strike breakers which had been successful in 1905 did not work this time. Although men from Arequipa were brought to the harbor, they were not able to do the hard and also dangerous work. Similarly, the railroad workers' labor could not simply be carried out by replacements. Many substitute workers were hurt, and one of the inexperienced Arequipeño peones even came to death. His funeral was attended by about 1.000 men; afterwards, Mollendo's striking workers as well as the Arequipeñan strike breakers protested together. 61 Facing workers who now carried a strong sense of unity and awareness of their own power, a public opinion that favored the workers' cause, 62 and devastating economic consequences that upset the Cámara de Comercio of Arequipa and regional authorities, the economic elites of Mollendo finally had to give in. The Arequipeñan chamber of commerce served as mediator between the conflicting parties, and on March 30, the subprefect cabled the following telegram to the prefect in Arequipa:
"Complázcome manifestarle anoche suscribióse arreglo entre jefes oficiales y delegados gremios navales y terrestres ante Cámara Comercio este puerto y dos representantes Cámara Arequipa, quedando consecuencia concluído conflicto obrero forma satisfactoria al haberse aumentado jornales y tarifas todos gremios quienes reanudan labores hoy." 63 Until now, the Mollendo harbor workers' strike of 1918 has been overlooked by notoriously Lima-centric Peruvian (labor) historians. Yet, it is important enough to be taken seriously in many respects: It was the longest strike the southern region had seen, and one of the longest in the history of early twentieth-century Peru. From the workers' perspective, it was, until then, also the most successful labor struggle as they gained substantial increases in wages and the reduction of working hours.
In September and October 1919, Arequipeñan subaltern social agitation reached its peak. Headed by the above-mentioned employees, the city saw the first general strike in its history. Despite occurring at the very beginning of Leguía's oncenio, and thus outside of the period under investigation, the strike will be treated here because it marked the end of the development considered in this article. The reasons to go on strike were first and foremost the increasing costs of living, then also caused by the worsened economic situation brought about by the end of the war in Europe. 64 Secondly, borrowing from Sebastian Conrad and Dominic Sachsenmaier, the strike represented a "global moment". 65 The revolutions in Mexico and in Russia, as well as the spread of socialist ideas and ideology in combination with the severe living conditions resulted in an outburst of social conflicts all over the Americas. Roughly simultaneous to the semana trágica in Buenos Aires, a general strike in Lima ended successfully for the capital's subaltern population in January 1919. Workers, artisans, employees, and students had asserted the partial introduction of the eight-hour day. 66 Thirdly, the benefits of reduced working hours did not reach Arequipa. The wholesalers and other employers still told their men to work ten, twelve, or even more hours a day. A fourth factor was the fact that the populist Leguía touted for the workers' favor as his power had not been consolidated, despite continued repression of leftist political activists under the new administration. The right to strike was guaranteed in the constitutional norms, but only on the condition that arbitrage tribunals would be established. 67 Perhaps, this legalization encouraged Arequipa's heterogeneous subalterns in their decision to implement a general strike so as to end the social maladies. Moreover, it must have been encouraging that Eleodoro M. del Prado, who himself had been a broker for subaltern interests in the early 1900s, was announced new prefect in August 1919.
The workers and artisans were represented by the recently founded Comité Pro-Abaratamiento de las Subsistencias -in which the anarchist Sociedad de Obreros, the Sociedad fraternal of the railroad workers, the Coalición Obrera de los Barrios and the liberal-independent Centro Social Obrero and Cooperativa Obrera were involved, among others. 68 The committee closely cooperated with Arequipa's employees, who, on September 26, founded the Asamblea General de Empleados. 69 On the next day, the assembly's executive committee, presided by Manuel Jesús Montoya, presented a memorandum which not only proclaimed substantial and detailed increases in wages and the reduction of working hours, but also established rules for holidays, retirement, and job prospects. In case these claims were not met within five days, the signatories threatened another strike. 70 Simultaneously, the Comité Pro-Abaratamiento de las Subsistencias issued a statement urging the adjustment of rents and food prices and announcing popular resistance in case of non-fulfillment. 71 The elites failed to respond to the claims of the two papers. All negotiations ended without results, and thus the Asamblea that had integrated the city's workers and was renamed Asamblea General de Empleados y Obreros del Comercio de Arequipa declared a general strike in a meeting attended by more than 4.000 Arequipeños -this is about 10 percent of the population -on October 3. In Mollendo, workers and employees coalesced as well and decided to join the strike in order to fight for higher wages. Here, the reduction of working hours had been achieved in 1918 and was not a major topic. During the strike, commercial life in Arequipa and Moll endo came to a complete halt, affecting also Cuzco, Puno, and even Bolivia. Solidarity among the subalterns was enormous. Even schools had to close, and the students of UNSA went on strike, too. By and large the protest remained peaceful. This was the result not only of the new legal framework and the personality of del Prado, but also of a large presence of army and police forces as well as the discipline of the protesters. only in Arequipa, nor only in Peru), and workers' rights -including the eight-hour day and the claim for proper pay -have been cut.
Conclusion
The years of the so-called "Aristocratic Republic" between 1895 and 1919 can be considered the formative years of Peru's working class. In my regional case study on Arequipa, I have expanded the historiographical frame and thereby was able to show (1) how local subalterns formed a collective identity as workers; (2) that, though guided by their political brokers, they developed their own political and social ideas and that they formulated their independent claims for broader political participation after the Piérola-Revolution had achieved nothing with regard to social and political changes for subalterns; (3) that they organized themselves; (4) that they won political representation; (5) that they enforced their interests by making use of a set of actions, especially strikes; and (6) that members of the working class became self-conscious participants in local and regional politics as well as in social affairs.
My argument is not to suggest a natural progress, a straight path in the development of subaltern politics in Arequipa from the Piérola-Revolution to the general strike of 1919. While new subaltern organizations such as the Centro Social Obrero or the Coalición Obrera de los Barrios emerged, traditional strands of artisan organizations remained in existence, too. And ideas of a socialist revolution coexisted with reformist orientations. Political negotiation even resulted in Mostajo and Málaga quitting the LiberalIndependientes.
Neither do I suggest a homogenization of Arequipa's subalterns. Above all, artisans protected their "holy" independence, and despite occasionally assuming a collective workers' identity to enforce their claim for broader participation (for instance on May Day) they continued to distinguish themselves -socio-economically and in certain cultural aspects -from railroaders, employees, and of course the lumpenproletariat. 76 But as I have outlined in this article, the formation of Arequipa's working class, the development of subaltern political culture, the interplay of (radical) liberal and socialist ideas, and the collaboration of upper and middle class intellectuals and workers, artisans, and employees in Arequipa can serve as a general orientation for similar processes in Peru and beyond.
